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The Pregnant Imagination, Fetal Rights,
and Women's Bodies: A Historical
Inquiry
Julia Epstein*
Competing historical and cultural understandings of the human
body make clear that medicine and the law construe bodily truths
from differing knowledge bases. Jurists rely virtually entirely on
medical testimony to analyze biological data, and medical profes-
sionals are not usually conversant with the legal ramifications of their
diagnoses. In early modern Europe, both physicians and jurists
recognized that their respective professions were governed by
different epistemological standards, a view articulated by F6lix Vicq
d'Azyr (1748-1794), anatomist and secretary to the Royal Society of
Medicine in France from 1776. Vicq d'Azyr noted that while lawyers
were required to make unyielding decisions based on conflicting laws,
customs, and decrees, physicians were permitted more latitude for
uncertainty.' In the late twentieth century, Western medicine and
law have become inextricably entwined as technologies have produced
new ethical dilemmas facing medicolegal jurisprudence.
The authority of women to voice and explain their experiences of
pregnancy and childbirth before and during the eighteenth century
contrasts powerfully with the twentieth century's reliance on
medicolegal decisions to define these experiences. In early modern
Europe, women controlled information, experience, and beliefs
concerning reproduction, and women held authority over it. A
woman only became officially and publicly pregnant when she felt her
* The author would like to thank Robert Kieft, Reference Librarian at Haverford College,
and the librarians at the Historical Collections of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia for
research assistance. Estelle Cohen, Ruth Colker, Kathryn Kolbert, Linda McClain, Nigel
Paneth, Reva Siegel, and M. Elizabeth Sandel were also generous with their expertise in history,
medicine, and the law.
1. See Lindsay Wilson, Women and Medicine in the French Enlightenment: The Debate over
"maladies des femmes" (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 65. Vicq d'Azyr
became the first Secretary to the Socidtd Royale, which he helped to found in 1776.
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fetus quicken, or move inside her, and she alone could ascertain and
report the occurrence of quickening. In 1765, William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England stated that life "begins in the
contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the
mother's womb" (emphasis added).2
A pregnancy did not exist until there was quickening, as announced
by the pregnant woman, and a child did not exist until it was born
alive. Pregnancy in the West today, in contrast, usually entails
certification by a medical professional, and is verifiable through a
number of tactile, laboratory, and visual interventions into a woman's
body, from palpation to chemical analysis to ultrasonography. Focus
on the fetus as an entity that is available to medical and legal
professionals for pronouncement and intervention, and that can be
discussed separately from the womb that contains it, is very much a
modern phenomenon.3 In a sense, female interiority has been made
public, while women's bodily exterior has attained juridical and moral
privacy rights.4
It is useful to examine these sharp contrasts between eighteenth-
and twentieth-century ideas about pregnancy in order to understand
better the current quagmire which has trapped attitudes toward
pregnant women. During the eighteenth century in Europe, heated
controversy surrounded the issue of whether the mental activity of a
pregnant woman could cause her fetus to become misshapen, and thus
2. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (London: n.p., 1765), 1:129.
Thomas Cobham wrote in his manual for confessors (c. 1216) that striking a pregnant woman
in such a way that she miscarried was punishable by death if the fetus was "formed," but
required only monetary restitution if the fetus was "unformed." Cited in G.R. Dunstan,
"Introduction: Text and Context," in The Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic and
European Traditions, ed. G.R. Dunstan (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), 5. Angus
McLaren comments on the demise of quickening as a juridical definition in Reproductive Rituals:
The Perception of Fertility in England from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century (London:
Methuen, 1984). 138. Barbara Duden also remarks on this phenomenon in Disembodying
Women: Perspectives on Pregnancy and the Unborn (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University
Press. 1993), 82.
3. See Lisa Cody, "The Doctor's in Labour; or a New Whim Wham from Guildford,"
Gender & History 4 (Summer 1992): 175-96. Cody argues that "[i]n the eighteenth century,
doctors were forced to listen to women to gain knowledge about reproduction" and, like Duden,
dates the silencing of the female body to the nineteenth century, when medicine gained a kind
of authority that no longer needed to be authenticated by women's voices. Indeed, a 1959 article
in a medical journal not only questions the authority of women's accounts of their own
experiences of pregnancy, but actively terms such accounts a factor in misdiagnosing causes of
birth malformations: "Maternal memory bias is a source of error most difficult to control. The
mother of a malformed child is likely to try hard to find a 'reason' for the child's defect in the
events of the pregnancy. Thus the mother of an abnormal child will be more likely to remember
unusual events during the pregnancy than will the mother of a normal child." F.C. Fraser,
"Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human Beings," Journal of Chronic Diseases 10
(August 1959): 97-110.
4. Duden argues that this change occurred in the nineteenth century, when the woman
yielded to the fetus as the focus of pregnancy, in a chapter entitled "The Uterine Police," in
Disembodying Women, 94-95.
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to be born malformed at birth. Analyzing the way this controversy
was articulated in Europe during the Enlightenment, I will argue,
helps us to understand the recent trend toward criminalizing the
behavior or status of pregnant women in relation to their gestating
fetuses. In this Article, I suggest that knowing the history of the
thorny decisions we face concerning women and reproduction can
help us to appreciate the importance of the controversies in which we
are currently embroiled.
I
In 1991, a Florida appellate court upheld Jennifer Clarice Johnson's
1989 conviction under a Florida statute that criminalizes delivery of
controlled substances to minors. Her newborn infant had tested
positive for cocaine. Johnson was convicted for "gestational substance
abuse" and sentenced to drug rehabilitation and fifteen years
probation. The court found that Johnson had passed crack cocaine
to her fetus via the umbilical cord; its opinion signalled the first
successful prosecution of a pregnant woman in the United States for
prenatal damage to a fetus.5  The following year, the Florida
Supreme Court unanimously overturned the conviction, declining "the
State's invitation to walk down a path that the law, public policy,
reason and common sense forbid it to tread."6 By mid-1992, more
than 160 women had been prosecuted in the United States for drug
use during pregnancy through a variety of charges (e.g., criminal child
abuse, assault with a deadly weapon, drug trafficking), although at this
writing no state or federal laws specifically criminalize prenatal
maternal behavior. Most of the women who were prosecuted were
women of color living in poverty. Many pleaded guilty or accepted
plea bargains, but all twenty-three women who have challenged their
prosecutions to date have won their cases on grounds that their
prosecutions were unconstitutional or without legal basis.7
Jennifer Johnson, twenty-three years old, poor, and African-
American, became the first woman in the United States to be
5. Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). For discussions of this case,
see Christina von Cannon Burdette, "Fetal Protection-An Overview of Recent State Legislative
Response to Crack Cocaine Abuse by Pregnant Women," Memphis State University Law Review
22 (fall 1991): 119-35; Wendy Chavkin, "Jennifer Johnson's Sentence," Journal of Clinical Ethics
1 (1991): 140-41; Dorothy E. Roberts, "Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy," Harvard Law Review 104 (7): 1419-82 (1991); and
Ruth Colker, Abortion & Dialogue: Pro-Choice, Pro-Life, & American Law (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1992).
6. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
7. Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Punishing Women for Their Behavior During
Pregnancy: A Public Health Disaster, February 2, 1993. This pamphlet published by the Center
lists the cases to date, and is available from the Center, 120 Wall St.. New York, NY 10005. My
thanks to Kathryn Kolbert. Vice President of the Center, for this information.
1995]
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convicted of delivering drugs to her fetus in utero.8 Crucial to her
prosecution was the fact that Johnson was not convicted of using
drugs, only of exposing her fetus to drugs. Had Johnson terminated
her pregnancy, the prosecution would never have taken place. The
charges brought against Johnson concerned drug exposure rather than
harm. The government introduced no evidence to prove that
Johnson's drug use adversely affected her children; on the contrary,
there was testimony that Johnson's children were healthy and normal.
Dorothy E. Roberts has argued that race and class figured
prominently in the Johnson prosecution, and also generally influence
the state's choice to punish, rather than to provide services for,
pregnant drug addicts, who are primarily poor African-Americans.
"These women are not punished simply because they may harm their
unborn children," Roberts asserts. "They are punished because the
combination of their poverty, race, and drug addiction is seen to make
them unworthy of procreating." 9
Criminal cases such as the one brought against Jennifer Johnson
have profound repercussions for ideas about women's bodies,
pregnancy, and fetuses. Such prosecutions necessarily vest fetuses
with the status of persons whose rights can be asserted against the
rights of their mothers, thereby creating an adversarial relation
between pregnant women and their fetuses. The legal notion of fetal
personhood is relatively new in our legal discourse and, ironically,
results in part from the 1973 United States Supreme Court decision
on abortion in Roe v. Wade. The majority in Roe held that "the
unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense," and that "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn."10  However, the
8. State v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), aft'd, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd. 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
9. Roberts, "Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies," 1472. Roberts points out that
crack cocaine addiction--overwhelmingly a phenomenon of African-Americans-has been
singled out for these prosecutions, even though there is compelling evidence that prenatal use
of other kinds of drugs, such as alcohol or marijuana, causes fetal harm. Other drugs tend to
find niches in middle-class white populations. Johnson's crack addiction came to light because
she confided her drug use to her obstetrician at a public hospital. The state organized its
prosecution on the theory that Johnson's efforts to get help for her addiction showed that she
knew her drug use harmed her fetus. Ibid., 1449. In People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1991), the court held that use of cocaine by a pregnant woman cannot be subject to
criminal prosecution under a statute that prohibits delivery of cocaine.
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). An interesting contrast to Roe, and historical
precursor of abortion debates, can be found in the mid-eighteenth-century Petition of the Unborn
Babes to the Censors of the Royal College of Physicians of London, 2nd ed. (London: M.
Cooper, 1751). This document represents a response to two physicians of the Royal College,
referred to as Drs. Pocus and Maulus, who argued against an inquiry into the deaths of six
children delivered by a man-midwife. The Petition tried to convince the physicians that "these
Children ... were distinct Beings, ... and were equally entitled to Preservation with their
Mothers." Ibid., 4-5.
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trimester division that defined "viability" in Roe paradoxically relied
upon the determination of a certain moment at which a fetus becomes
an entity separate and separable in law from its mother. Fetal
viability as a concept inherits much of the power of quickening, but
with the crucial difference that it is decided by physicians and jurists
rather than by pregnant women."'
In early modern Europe, the pregnant woman was responsible for
prenatal care, because pregnancy was not the medicalized condition
it is today. The period's advice literature tended to be written by and
for women (although only a small percentage of aristocratic women
could read), and included counsel on nutrition, exercise, and travel as
well as recipes for abortifacients, often described as mixtures to
induce menstruation or to remove false pregnancies. 2 The literature
11. Mary Poovey argues that the trimester scheme for viability used in Roe produces a
tripartite division in authority over a pregnancy: pregnant women have choices in the first
trimester, physicians make decisions about the second trimester, and courts regulate the third
trimester. Poovey points out that both pregnant women and fetuses challenge the notion of the
humanist subject; pregnant women because they are not unitary, and fetuses because they are
not self-determining. Poovey, "Feminism and Postmodernism-Another View." boundary 19
(2): 34-52 (1992). See Dawn E. Johnsen, "The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection," Yale Law Journal 95 (3): 599-
625 (1986), and "Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case against the Criminalization of
'Fetal Abuse,"' Harvard Law Review 101 (5): 994-1012 (1988), for arguments against the idea
of fetal rights. Johnsen points out that criminalizing substance use by pregnant women only
hinders them from seeking drug treatment and from getting prenatal care, for fear of being
prosecuted. For the most cogent argument on the other side, see John A. Robertson,
"Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth," Virginia Law
Review 69 (April 1983): 405-64. Robertson assumes that all pregnancies carried to term include
the free choice both to be pregnant and not to abort. For discussion of the personhood status
of the fetus from medical, legal, theological, and philosophical points of view, see several articles
in William B. Bondeson et al., eds., Abortion and the Status of the Fetus (Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Publishing Co., 1983): Leonard Glantz, "Is the Fetus a Person? A Lawyer's View," 107-17;
Patricia D. White, "The Concept of Person, the Law, and the Use of the Fetus in Biomedicine,"
119-57; Gerald D. Perkoff, "Toward a Normative Definition of Personhood," 159-66; H. Tristram
Engelhardt, Jr., "Viability and the Use of the Fetus," 183-208, and Caroline Whitbeck, "The
Moral Implications of Regarding Women as People: New Perspectives on Pregnancy and
Personhood," 242-72. Whitbeck's essay is the only one in the collection that focuses on the
experiences and situations of pregnant women. She argues that the maternal-fetal relation has
been "inadequately conceptualized." Ibid., 253-54.
A broad discussion of the issues implicated by prenatal technologies and knowledge is in Ruth
Hubbard, The Politics of Women's Biology (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
1990), 141-98. Physicians, too, define the maternal-fetal relation as adversarial, in one textbook
referring to the possibility that "the intrauterine environment is hostile." Leo R. Boler, Jr. and
Norbert Gleicher refer to "a precarious medicolegal situation" and conclude that "it remains to
be determined whether fetal indications allow infringement on maternal rights," in "Maternal
versus Fetal Rights," chapter 14 of Principles of Medical Therapy in Pregnancy, ed. Norbert
Gleicher (New York: Plenum Press, 1985), 141. See also W.A. Bowes, Jr., and D. Selgestad,
"Fetal versus Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal Perspectives," Obstetrics and Gynecology 58
(1981): 209-14.
12. For discussions about writings and attitudes concerning women's reproductive health in
medieval medicine, see Beryl Rowland, ed., Medieval Woman's Guide to Health: The First
English Gynecological Handbook (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981), and John F.
Benton, "Trotula. Women's Problems, and the Professionalization of Medicine in the Middle
Ages," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 59 (spring 1985): 30-53. An excellent account of early
modern beliefs about menstruation is in Patricia Crawford, "Attitudes to Menstruation in
5
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advised pregnant women not to travel in carriages or ride horseback,
and not to consume strong liquor or spicy foods. Some advice, and
its underlying rationale, differed from today's advice for pregnant
women. Wine, for example, was often recommended during
pregnancy, but strong drink while pregnant or lactating was thought
to cause childhood rickets. The traditional diet in England during the
seventeenth century was highly salted and included a high con-
sumption of alcohol, estimated by Robert Fogel at the stunning
amount of between 3 and 9 ounces of absolute alcohol daily.
3
However, nothing existed that bore any resemblance to our current
ideas about the etiology of fetal-alcohol syndrome. 4
A long history predates recent challenges to maternal autonomy in
decision making about pregnancy and in blame for its outcome. In
Dietrich v. Northampton (1884), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
denied cause for wrongful death in the case of a premature stillborn
fetus born after its mother had fallen. Holmes argued that the fetus
is part of the mother and is not owed a separate duty of care.'5
Seventeenth-Century England," Past and Present 91 (1981): 47-73.
13. Robert W. Fogel, "Nutrition and the Decline in Mortality Since 1700: Some Additional
Preliminary Findings," (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1986), Working Paper No. 1802,
68-69. It is clear from this figure, and from much of the imaginative literature of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, as well as from evidence concerning popular entertainments, that
drunkenness was relatively routine. By the mid-eighteenth century, concern had mounted about
the effects on infants of their mothers' excessive drinking during pregnancy. See Alvin E. Rodin,
"Infants and Gin Mania in Eighteenth-Century London," Journal of the American Medical
Association 245 (March 27, 1981): 1237-39. For another discussion of nutrition during pregnancy,
see Michael K. Eshleman, "Diet During Pregnancy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,"
Journal of the History of Medicine 30 (1975): 23-39. I am indebted here to Linda A. Pollock's
excellent overview of pregnancy among the landed elite in England in "Embarking on a Rough
Passage: The Experience of Pregnancy in Early-Modern Society," in Women as Mothers in Pre-
Industrial England, ed. Valerie Fildes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1990), 39-67.
Advice and practice concerning diet differs markedly among cultures, and also varies
significantly by classes, nations, and ethnic groups.
14. Prosecutions of pregnant women in early modern Europe were confined to those who
conceived out of wedlock. See Patricia Crawford, "The Construction and Experience of
Maternity," in Women as Mothers in Pre-Industrial England, especially 9-10. The rate of
prosecutions for prenuptial pregnancy varied. In addition, laws concerning bastards made unwed
motherhood extremely difficult. An illegitimate child could not inherit property, and poor
women had few means to force the fathers to marry them. Adultery and fornication were also
prosecutable offenses. Ellen Fitzpatrick discusses one case of attitudes toward, and treatment
of, unwed mothers in North America during this period in "Childbirth and an Unwed Mother
in Seventeenth-Century New England," Signs 8 (summer 1983): 744-49. For other historical
discussions of prosecuting pregnant women, see June K. Burton, "Human Rights Issues
Affecting Women in Napoleonic Legal Medicine Textbooks," History of European Ideas 8 (4):
427-34 (1987), and Adrienne Rogers, "Women and the Law," in French Women and the Age of
Enlightenment, ed. Samia Spencer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 33-48. It is
important to note that throughout the eighteenth century, Western Europeans believed that
female orgasm was required for conception. If she became pregnant, a woman was in no
position to claim rape because pleasure was seen as implying consent. Changes in these views,
and changes in views of female sexual pleasure more generally, are traced for North America
in Carl N. Degler, "What Ought to Be and What Was: Women's Sexuality in the Nineteenth
Century," American Historical Review 79 (1974): 1467-90.
15. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 (1884).
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Courts followed Holmes's analysis concerning prenatal injuries until
1946, when a District of Columbia court recognized a fetus as a
"distinct individual.' 6  Thus, the concept of fetal personhood in
United States law is a post-World War II phenomenon.
"At all stages of pregnancy," writes Lynn M. Paltrow, "the fetus is
completely dependent on the woman-everything she does could
affect it. . . . Recognizing 'fetal abuse' moves us toward criminalizing
pregnancy itself because no woman can provide the perfect womb."' 7
Paltrow argues that we face a slippery slope: the prohibition against
cocaine could similarly promote bias against alcohol and tobacco,
strenuous exercise, poor nutrition, driving a car, riding in an airplane,
or owning a gun. The imperfect womb, while not the object of legal
sanctions until after 1946, has been targeted for centuries as the
source and foundation of birth disabilities and malformations.
Although the move toward criminalizing the conduct of pregnant
women is radically new in United States jurisprudence, it harks back
to an ancient tradition of searching for explanations for birth mishaps
in the minds and bodies of pregnant women, a tradition that reached
its peak during the eighteenth century.
16. Bonbrest v. Katz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946). See Tracy Dobson and Kimberly
K. Eby, "Criminal Liability for Substance Abuse During Pregnancy: The Controversy of
Maternal v. Fetal Rights." Saint Louis University Law Journal 36 (spring 1992): 655-94. Leonard
Glantz writes that "although the law rarely lends itself to blanket statements, it can be clearly
stated that a fetus is not a person under the law. . . . [F]etuses are not required to be
protected," in "Is the Fetus a Person? A Lawyer's View," in Bondeson et al., eds., Abortion,
116.
17. Lynn M. Paltrow, "No: 'Fetal Abuse': Should We Recognize It as a Crime?" ABA
Journal 39 (August 1989): 39. See also Lynn M. Paltrow, "When Becoming Pregnant Is a
Crime," Criminal Justice Ethics 9 (1): 41-47 (1990). This issue is a symposium on "Criminal
Liability for Fetal Endangerment." It is important to mention that there remains controversy
over the precise effects of maternal cocaine use on a gestating fetus. It is difficult to single out
intrauterine cocaine exposure as a factor in fetal development, because often prenatal cocaine
exposure is only one of a number of factors-poor nutrition, lead poisoning, cigarettes, other
drugs. as well as multiple short-term foster placements, homelessness, abuse, and the
like-determining outcomes such as low birth weight or early cognitive deficits. See Linda C.
Mayes et al., "The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to Judgment," Journal of
the American Medical Association 267 (January 15, 1992): 406-08. The authors argue that factors
such as methodological problems in determining the developmental effects of cocaine use during
pregnancy, and bias in clinical decisions about reporting low-income and black women for drug
use, make it difficult to assess the problem and label a large group of children as "irremediably
damaged." Ibid., 408. Such factors also "work toward exempting society from having to face
other possible explanations of the children's plight--explanations such as poverty, community
violence, inadequate education, and diminishing employment opportunities that require deeper
understanding of wider social values." Ibid., 406. Physicians have remarked on external factors
affecting fetal growth such as socioeconomic conditions and tobacco smoking. See Donald B.
Cheek, Joan E. Graystone, and Margaret Niall, "Factors Controlling Fetal Growth," Clinical
Obstetrics and Gynecology 20 (December 1977): 925-42.
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During the eighteenth century, physiologists, philosophers, and
medical commentators engaged in a heated debate about whether or
not imaginative activity in the minds of pregnant women could
explain birthmarks and birth malformations. Seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century developments in embryology and in
neurophysiology were crucial for the development of this quarrel
about pregnancy and the power of the mind. The adversarial and
internally conflicting discourses that constituted this debate grew out
of diverse cultural beliefs about the human body and about women
and mothering, and were embedded in eighteenth-century medical
writings.
Demarcation of bodily borders was complicated in the eighteenth
century.18 While the physical body was known to have a skin, that
surface material represented not only a boundary, but also a fluid
surface where interior life revealed itself. 9  Inside and outside,
body/self and the external world operated in a process of continual
exchange. Early in the century, women did not "reproduce" when
they bore children; rather, they participated in generatio, or "fruitfu-
lness." The reproductive apparatus of a woman's body that today is
classified and studied under the medical rubrics of obstetrics and
gynecology did not exist as a unit of medical knowledge in the early
eighteenth century. Fetuses were nourished and developed by
women, whose anatomical structures were far better understood than
their functions.
During the Enlightenment, Europeans insisted on the relation of
bodies as classificatory systems. Categories of the body delimited
both sensory experience and human notions of autonomy and
aesthetics. The female body contained a particular potential to
invoke the monstrous because of the female's capacity to create
monstrosity through her capacity for generation.'0 By the mid-
nineteenth century, representations of women's bodies were subsumed
into an etherealized domestic ideal, but early-eighteenth-century
18. See Barbara Duden, The Woman Beneath the Skin: A Doctor's Patients in Eighteenth-
Century Germany, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991),
and Ludmilla Jordanova, "Guarding the Body Politic: Volney's Catechism of 1793," in 1789:
Reading, Writing, Revolution, Proceedings of the Essex Conference on the Sociology of Literature,
ed. Francis Barker et al. (Essex: University of Essex Press, 1982), 12-21.
19. For one view of how mechanistic ideas of physiology operated in eighteenth-century
literature, see Juliet McMaster, "The Body Inside the Skin: The Medical Model of Character in
the Eighteenth-Century Novel," Eighteenth-Century Fiction 4 (July 1992): 277-300.
20. On Jonathan Swift's deployment of this idea, see Susan Bruce, "The Flying Island and
Female Anatomy: Gynaecology and Power in Gulliver's Travels," Genders 2 (Summer 1988): 60-
76.
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images of women reflected the perceived threat of an unsocialized,
willful, and appetitive female sexuality.2' In the Enlightenment,
Europeans believed that ideas physically manifested themselves across
the bodies of pregnant women. The eighteenth-century maternal
imagination debates were therefore crucial not only for their cultural
representation and medical analysis of women's bodies, but also for
the ability of women to control their own lives.
In London in 1714, English surgeon Daniel Turner published a
medical treatise called De Morbis Cutaneis: A Treatise of Diseases
Incident to the Skin. Turner's brief treatise was important as the first
English dermatology text in the history of medicine, but its fame rests
on the vehement debate it provoked. In De Morbis Cutaneis, Turner
defined what he called "that Faculty of the sensitive Soul called
Phansy or Imagination" as a physiological power that resided in the
brain. It operated, he argued, by irradiating nervous fluid inward in
response to impressions received by the external organs, admittedly
a vague definition from a modern perspective. Turner needed to
define the imagination in his treatise because he made a controversial
claim in his chapter about the causes of birthmarks. That chapter
carried a typically long-winded eighteenth-century title: "Of Spots and
Marks of a diverse Resemblance, imprest upon the Skin of the Foetus,
by the Force of the Mother's Fancy; with some Things premis'd, of
the strange and almost incredible Power of Imagination, more
especially in pregnant Women." Turner could not explain his claim.
In fact, he wrote: "how these strange Alterations should be wrought,
or the Foetus cut, wounded and maimed, as if the same were really
done with a Weapon, whilst the Mother is unhurt, and merely by the
Force of her Imagination, is, I must confess ingenuously, . . . Supra
Captum, i.e. above my Understanding."'22 James Augustus Blondel,
a Parisian educated at the University of Leiden and a noted member
of the College of Physicians of London, responded virulently to
Turner's assertion. Blondel asked: "[W]hat can be more scandalous,
and provoking, than to suppose, that those whom God Almighty has
endow'd, not only with so many charms, but also with an extraor-
dinary Love and Tenderness for their Children, instead of answering
the End they are made for, do bread [sic] Monsters by the Wanton-
ness of their Imagination?"'
21. See Mary Poovey, Uneven Developments: The Ideological Work of Gender in Mid-
Victorian England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 9-10.
22. Daniel Turner, De Morbis Cutaneis (London: R. Bonwicke et al., 1714), 102-28.
23. James Augustus Blondel, preface to The Strength of Imagination in Pregnant Women
(London: J. Peele, 1727). Both Barbara Maria Stafford, in Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen
in Enlightenment Art and Medicine (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 314-15, and Marie-
H616ne Huet, in Monstrous Imagination (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993),
1995]
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The theory of the maternal imagination, or maternal impressions,
embraced two quite separate ideas. First, a pregnant woman's
longings, if ungratified, were understood to mark her fetus. Hence,
if a woman's overwhelming desire for strawberries could not be
satisfied, her infant would be born with a strawberry mark.24
Cravings (or aversions) of this sort did not always involve food. They
could also pertain to religious or sexual activities, or to obsessive acts
or thoughts. Yet it is telling that the vast majority of examples of the
first type of maternal impression involved a pregnant woman's
uncontrollable appetite for fruit. The French physician-theologian
Nicholas Malebranche, a major influence on Turner, had written in his
1674 De la recherche de la v~ritg [In Search of Truth] that a mother's
desire for fruit caused her fetus to imagine and desire the fruit as
well, so that "these unfortunate infants thus become like the things
they desire too ardently."'  It is not hard to find here a theological
analogy between monstrous offspring and forbidden fruit.
2 6
Second, the pregnant woman needed to avoid disturbing experien-
ces at all costs, on the theory that negative experiences would be
mirrored in a related physical deformity in her child. For example,
if the sight of a street beggar missing the fingers of one hand startled
her, her infant would be born lacking the fingers of the corresponding
hand. The anonymous early eighteenth-century midwifery handbook,
Aristotle's Compleat and Experienc'd Midwife, contained this advice:
"Let none present any strange and unwholesome Thing to her, nor so
much as name it, lest she should desire it, and not be able to get it,
and so either cause her to Miscarry, or the Child to have some
Deformity on that Account."27 John Maubray went further in his
64-67, take up this debate. See also Philip K. Wilson, "Out of Sight, Out of Mind? The Daniel
Turner-James Blondel Debate over Maternal Impressions" (master's thesis, The Johns Hopkins
University. 1987).
24. Curiously. a 1908 obstetrics textbook discussed cravings in a very different way. They
were taken seriously, and although this text granted that cravings were a common feature of
many pregnancies. it also suggested that such cravings are "deleterious" and that pregnant
women must exercise self-control in order to overcome their desires. The author later asserted
that "[r]eproduction is the test of a nervous woman, and should she be in any way mentally or
physically weak, her brain may give way under the trial." Ernest Hastings Tweedy, Tweedy's
Practical Obstetrics, ed. Bethel Solomons, 6th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), 218,
496.
25. Nicholas Malebranche, The Search After Truth, trans. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J.
Olscamp (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980), 117.
26. See Huet, Monstrous Imagination, 48-49. Stafford also connects epidermal stains with
Original Sin in Body Criticism, 318.
27. Aristotle's Compleat and Experienc'd Midwife, 4th ed. (London: by the booksellers,
1721), 30. This work was an anonymous and popular version of Aristotle's De generatione et
corruptione and was continuously in print into the 1930s in Great Britain. See Paul-Gabriel
Boucd, "Imagination, Pregnant Women, and Monsters in Eighteenth-Century England and
France," in Sexual Underworlds of the Enlightenment, ed. G.S. Rousseau and Roy Porter
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 86-100.
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popular The Female Physician (1724). Maubray placed responsibility
for these misadventures on the pregnant woman herself: "She ought
discreetly to suppress all Anger, Passion, and other Perturbations of
Mind, and avoid entertaining too serious or melancholick Thoughts;
since all such tend to impress a Depravity of Nature upon the Infant's
Mind, and Deformity on its Body." In addition, Maubray suggested
that pregnant women must maintain domestic harmony in their
households and marriages. According to Maubray, "there never
ought so much as a Cloud to appear in [her] Conjugal Society; since
all such unhappy Accidents strongly affect the growing Infant."28
Families took seriously the desires of pregnant women and the need
to satisfy them. A striking early example of this truth: When his
pregnant wife told the German botanist Joachim Camerarius (1534-
1598) that she felt overwhelmed by the need to smash a dozen eggs
in his face, he obliged her by submitting to her desire.29 Actually,
the best-known maternal imagination case in England was a fraud: in
1726, Mary Tofts of Godalming in Surrey, commonly known as the
"rabbet woman," contrived a lucrative hoax by claiming that she gave
birth to seventeen rabbits after being frightened in the fields.3" In
1746, the Gentleman's Magazine, a politically moderate English
monthly that covered a wide range of medical topics, published a
typical report of a malformed birth ascribed to the maternal
imagination:
The wife of one Rich. Haynes of Chelsea, aged 35 and mother of
16 fine children, was deliver'd of a monster, with nose and eyes
like a lyon, no palate to the mouth, hair on the shoulders, claws
like a lion instead of fingers, no breast-bone, something
surprising out of the navel as big as an egg, and one foot longer
28. John Maubray, The Female Physician (London: James Holland, 1724), 75-77. Maubray
was considered a mystic and not taken seriously by medical practitioners, cited in Dolores
Peters, "The Pregnant Pamela: Characterization and Popular Medical Attitudes in the
Eighteenth Century," Eighteenth-Century Studies 14 (Summer 1981): 437.
29. This example is cited in McLaren, Reproductive Rituals, 40. See also Jacques Gdlis,
History of Childbirth: Fertility, Pregnancy and Birth in Early Modern Europe, trans. Rosemary
Morris (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1991), 53-58, originally published as L'Arbre et
le fruit (Paris: Fayard, 1984), which gives an overview of ideas about cravings and imaginings.
30. This event became a major popular scandal in England, particularly for John Howard,
the physician who claimed to have delivered the rabbits, and for Nathaniel St. Andrd and
Samuel Molyneux, who travelled to Guildford to ascertain the veracity of the reports. St. Andrd
was Anatomist-Royal (the royal physician), and when the hoax was exposed, he lost his job. For
a discussion of the Mary Tofts story, see S.A. Seligman, "Mary Tofts: the Rabbit Breeder,"
Medical History 5 (1961): 349-60, and Glennda Leslie, "Cheat and Imposter: Debate Following
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than the other.-She had been to see the lions in the Tower,
where she was much terrify'd with the old lion's noise.3'
According to the theory of maternal impressions, the birth of a
defective infant unveiled the secret passions of its mother. In some
ways, one could argue that the birth of an addicted baby today also
suggests a secret failure of its mother. The very term "crack baby"
implies a fissure or breakage in a mother's ability to reproduce. It is
not surprising, then, that the birth of what was invariably termed a
"monster" called into question, above all, the legitimacy of its
parentage. Malformed births represented a major social problem in
early modem Europe. A monstrous birth lacked legitimacy in a
fundamental way. Such an infant failed to resemble its (or any)
father; hence, in a social order ruled by the laws of primogeniture and
patrilineage, a malformed birth was a basic social disruption. Before
the sixteenth century, a monstrous birth signified the opposite of its
father's stamp. It was a portent, a sign of the wrath of God.32
Conflicts arose between the ecclesiastical interest in the immortal soul
of the infant and the secular authority's concern for determining
property rights, inheritance, and legitimacy. Both interests pressured
midwives, who were responsible for determining whether a live birth
had taken place (hence affecting primogeniture) and for baptizing
moribund newborns.
The notion of fetal personhood necessary to cases such as State v.
Johnson in 1989 was unthinkable in the eighteenth century when
newborns did not legally exist unless born alive. The familiar conflict
between saving the mother's life and preserving the product of her
labor was not at issue in early modern Europe. The mother's health
and survival unequivocally came first, as it was the pregnant woman
who was being delivered, not the fetus. This clear priority of concern
underlay the midwifery practice of manual version, using hands to
turn the fetus in the womb, and the typically male surgical practices
of craniotomy and embryotomy, as means of removing a dead fetus
from a living woman.33 This view was not limited to early modern
Europe. The Mishnah, for example, stipulates that an embryo can be
31. Gentleman's Magazine 16 (1746): 270; cited in Roy Porter, "Lay Medical Knowledge in
the Eighteenth Century: The Evidence of the Gentleman's Magazine," Medical History 29 (1985):
148. The best places to seek examples of birth malformations ascribed to the maternal
imagination are in the casebooks of practicing midwives and obstetricians. Two studies that use
these sources are Amalie M. Kass, "The Obstetrical Casebook of Walter Channing, 1811-1822,"
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 67 (Fall 1993): 494-523, and Duden, The Woman Beneath the
Skin, although neither Kass nor Duden focuses on the maternal imagination.
32. For useful background, see Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971).
33. See Lynne Tatlock, "Speculum Feminarum: Gendered Perspectives on Obstetrics and
Gynecology in Early Modern Germany," Signs 17 (Summer 1992): 725-60.
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dismembered to save the life of a woman, "for her life takes
precedence over its life" as long as its head has not yet emerged.
Once its head is visible, "it may not be touched, since we do not set
aside one life for another."'
III
The subject of maternal impressions did not by any means originate
either in the eighteenth century or in Europe. The belief that the
maternal mental state influences fetal development is ancient and can
be found in Hindu medical treatises that predate Western Hippocratic
medicine by many centuries." Ayurvedic texts argue that prenatal
beings are sentient and environmentally responsive. The Garbha
Upanishad and the Susruta-samhita, for example, claim that the fetus
expresses its desires through the mother's longings, and that such
longings must be gratified. The Caraka-samhita provides a guide for
pregnant women that equates certain eating habits (excessive sweets
or fish) or behaviors (sleepwalking or sexual promiscuity) with
character traits in the unborn child.36 The Judeo-Christian tradition
also offers a notable example of the theory that maternal sense
impressions mark offspring: the story of Jacob placing rods before his
flock so that they would bear speckled and spotted cattle.37
The two separate ideas that together form the concept of the
maternal imagination are quite different. Although both types are
involuntary on the part of the pregnant woman, cravings or obsessions
are active, whereas observing unsettling persons, or events, or
representations amounts to a passive experience that is externally
imposed. Both types of maternal impression ultimately raise
questions about the formulation of theories concerning female desire
and its location in the generative female body. Interestingly, the idea
of cravings is the one that persists both as folklore and in obstetrics
textbooks today-the pickles-and-ice-cream (or, in the 1959 Disney
animated classic "Lady and the Tramp," watermelon-and-chop-suey)
34. Ohaloth 7:6. Cited by L.E. Goodman, "The Fetus as a Natural Miracle: The
Maimonidean View," in The Human Embryo, 88.
35. The Ayurvedic views on embryology also include the notion that children's deformities
can be the result of parental sin in this or a previous life. See Vaidya Bhagwan Dash,
Embryology and Maternity in Ayurveda (New Delhi: Delhi Diary, 1975). See also Lakshmi
Kapani, trans., "Upanishad of the Embryo," and Kapani, "Note on the Garbha-Upanishad," in
Fragments for a History of the Human Body, vol. 3, ed. Michael Feher (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1989), 175-96.
36. See L.D. Hankoff and Ultamchandra L. Munver, "Prenatal Experience in Hindu
Mythology," New York State Journal of Medicine 80 (December 1988): 2006-14.
37. Gen. 30:31-43, Revised Standard Version.
19951
13
Epstein: The Pregnant Imagination, Fetal Rights, and Women's Bodies
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1995
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 7:139
takeover of the pregnant woman's appetite.3' But in their early
modern formulation, the maternal imagination debates proposed a
continuum between the passive reception of sensory experience, and
the active production of desire. The maternal imagination debaters
derived from the Lockean concept of the primacy of sensory
experience the closest approximation we get in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries to a notion of what women wanted.
In addition to the array of thinkers on generation from Heliodorus
and Empedocles to Etienne and Isidore Geoffry Saint-Hilaire (the
father-and-son founders of teratology, the scientific study of
monsters), dozens of writers participated in the maternal impressions
debate during the Enlightenment. Responding to the ideas of Daniel
Turner, Blondel published The Strength of Imagination in Pregnant
Women Examin'd; and the Opinion that Marks and Deformities in
Children arise from thence, Demonstrated to be a Vulgar Error (1727).
Turner counter-responded in 1730 with The Force of the Mother's
Imagination upon her Foetus in Utero. Henry Bracken's The
Midwife's Companion (1737) sided with Turner. Bracken cited the
example of the fingerless beggar and suggested the sociopolitical
implications of these ideas: "Indeed, such Objects as these [the
beggar] should be driven out of every Town, by express Order of the
Magistrate: For it is not hardly credible the Number of Children who
are born monstrous on such Accounts.,
39
A French argument in support of Blondel appeared in 1745 when
Bordeaux physician Isaac Bellet published his Lettres sur le pouvoir
de l'imagination des femmes enceintes. Bellet argued against maternal
impressions, and he also reported that this mistaken prejudice
destroyed the repose and health of pregnant women. The smallest
events made them anxious or alarmed, and they lived in fear of
experiencing or thinking something that would hurt their infants. This
situation was so dreadful, according to Bellet, that he asserted that
imaginary maladies became real ones and affected the infant in the
womb.' Later in the century, in The Pupil of Nature; or Candid
Advice to the Fair Sex (1797), Martha Mears presented the same
circular argument about maternal passions. Mears wrote that there
was no nervous communication between mother and fetus, but that
38. See Sheldon H. Cherry et al., eds., Rovinsky and Guttmacher's Medical, Surgical, and
Gynecologic Complications of Pregnancy, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1985), 623,
which alleges that pregnant women act out their conflicts through food: "Examples of cravings
are ice cream, and the situation where a woman wakes her husband up in the middle of the
night in winter asking for strawberries."
39. Henry Bracken, The Midwife's Companion; or, A Treatise of Midwifery (London: J.
Clarke, 1737), 40-41.
40. Isaac Bellet, Lettres sur le pouvoir de l'imagination des femmes enceintes (Paris: Fr~res
Gudrin, 1745), 3.
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"[i]t is of the utmost moment to root out of the mind those fatal
apprehensions; or they will often produce the very evils to which they
are so tremblingly alive." Disease during pregnancy may result, or
difficulty in delivery, and even "a puny, or distorted infant is
sometimes brought forth-the victim of its mother's terrors."4' In
1747, John Henry Mauclerc published a refutation of Blondel's 1727
treatise: Dr. Blondel Confuted: or, the Ladies Vindicated. Mauclerc's
subtitle, the Ladies Vindicated, reveals the underlying problem in
these quarrels: the status of pregnant women as rational beings. The
debate made clear both that the locus of responsibility for pregnancy
remained with women and that female interiority represented a
potential excess that must be policed.
The maternal imagination debate gradually died out, its ideas
subsumed in some measure into the science of teratology by the early
nineteenth century. Importantly, no definitive conclusion ever
resolved the quarrel, and belief in the power of the maternal
imagination remains in various cultures' folk beliefs. It is clear from
the language of the medical treatises that contributed to the maternal
impressions debate that the subject encompassed more than just the
maternal imagination's influence on fetal development. This debate
was about passion and power with respect to the early modern
understanding of the body as an envelope, a coating for the soul, a
receptacle whose corporeality was allegorical as well as physical.
Embryology did not emerge as a separate medical discipline until
the second half of the sixteenth century. The Turner-Blondel
contribution to ideas of generation appeared at the height of beliefs
in embryological preformation, the view that the whole human
structure exists in miniature prior to conception. Preformationist
views came in a variety of flavors and were not an eighteenth-century
invention, although they had been presented with greater reserve in
earlier periods.42 But around the end of the seventeenth century,
preformationist arguments began to appear frequently in medical
literature. The usual version of preformation was called animalculism
or spermaticism. It held that a preformed human being inhabited the
male seed. There was an interesting controversy concerning why, if
animalculism was valid, children often looked like their mothers. One
explanation involved the maternal imagination: vain pregnant women
looked at themselves in the glass, and their images then imprinted
onto the fetuses they carried. There was also a strain of prefor-
41. Martha Mears, The Pupil of Nature; or Candid Advice to the Fair Sex (London: for the
author, 1797), 27-28.
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mationism called ovism that saw the female egg as the repository for
the homunculus, a view that seemed to be shored up by Regnier de
Graaf's discovery of the ovarian follicle in 1672. The most extreme
version of preformationist belief was the notion of emboitement, or
encasement, which could be accommodated in either spermaticist or
ovist formulations. The Swiss anatomist Albrecht von Hailer offered
an ovist explanation of this all-inclusive view: "It follows that the
ovary of an ancestress will contain not only her daughter but also her
granddaughter, her great-granddaughter and her great-great-
granddaughter, and if it is once proved that an ovary can contain
many generations, there is no absurdity in saying that it contains them
all." '43 In other words, all potential human beings existed from the
moment of divine creation.
Blondel espoused animalculism, whereas Turner proposed a
continuity between fetal and maternal blood vessels, and followed an
epigenetic view-the view that the embryo develops structurally and
sequentially in utero through the growth and differentiation of
specialized cells." This debate embraced a central paradox in early
modern thinking about fetal development: Turner was relatively
accurate about maternal-fetal relations in utero but superstitious about
the mental stability of pregnant women, whereas Blondel was
inaccurate in his knowledge of gestational physiology but rejected the
prevailing folk beliefs about female irrationality and uncontrollability
during pregnancy. What is most striking is that both Turner's
imaginationist view, which attributed monstrous births to maternal
impressions, and Blondel's preformationist view, which argued that
the maternal role was merely to house the developing fetus, similarly
negated the agency of pregnant women. For preformationists, the
mother remained entirely passive and useless except as a vessel; for
imaginationists, the maternal imagination operated wholly beyond the
will of the mother, who could not shape it or impose meaning upon
it.
4 5
43. Cited in Joseph Needham, A History of Embryology (New York: Abelard-Schuman,
1959), 200, and in Andrea Henderson, "Doll-Machines and Butcher-Shop Meat: Models of
Childbirth in the Early Stages of Industrial Capitalism," Genders 12 (winter 1991): 100-19.
Marie-H6lne Huet points out that the encasement theory "should have excluded the possibility
that the maternal imagination could modify the shape of a progeny that had already been
formed since the beginning of time" in Monstrous Imagination, 42.
44. See Needham, A History of Embryology, 215-16. See also Shirley A. Roe, Matter, Life,
and Generation: 18th-Century Embryology and the Haller-Woolf Debate (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981); Josef Warkany, "Congenital Malformations in the Past," Journal of
Chronic Diseases 10 (1959): 84-96; Fraser, "Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human
Beings," 97-110; and F.C. Frigoletto, Jr. and Suzanne B. Rothchild, "Altered Fetal Growth: An
Overview," Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology 20 (December 1977): 915-23.
45. See Marie-Hdlne Huet, "Monstrous Imagination: Progeny as Art in French Classicism,"
Critical Inquiry 17 (summer 1991): 718-37. Jean-Baptiste Bdrard argued that fetal development
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So we are right back in a dilemma. The imaginationists believed
women's stories and gave them an active role in the development of
their fetuses, but at a price-they held women accountable for any
birth not entirely normal. The preformationists (including the ovists)
denied women any role in gestation except as pack animals but
absolved them of blame for the ensuing birth. The eighteenth-century
maternal imagination debates make clear that the ideological stakes
of assigning responsibility for birth outcomes are especially high. In
early modern Europe, assigning blame for the horror of defective or
malformed births affected inheritance, social organization, and
political power. In a social system dependent upon male lineage, it
was more than just politically and economically convenient to displace
this responsibility onto women's bodies and minds.
IV
The conflicting Enlightenment narratives that explain the etiology
of, and thus fix the blame for, "imperfect" infants bear striking
similarities to current ethical discussions stemming from the legal
battles that pit pregnant women against their fetuses. The underlying
significance of these narratives involves the legacy of blaming the
mother for her children's appearance and behavior. Blaming mothers
serves to justify a wide range of strategies for containing women's
minds by containing women's bodies.'
Regulatory discourses concerning the physiology and reproductive
roles of women have a long social history. In the eighteenth century,
physicians and philosophers debated the power of a pregnant woman's
mind to influence fetal development. In the nineteenth century,
medical practitioners in the United States led an anti-abortion
campaign intended to establish medicine as a scientific profession and
to regulate reproduction. In the nineteenth century, as in the
eighteenth, assumptions about maternal duty dictated attitudes
concerning the behavior of pregnant women. In a passage that makes
these assumptions clear, nineteenth-century Philadelphia physician
Hugh Lenox Hodge attacked pregnant women for disobeying medical
advice: "They eat and drink, they walk and ride, they will practice no
took place entirely "A l'insu" of the mother's will and therefore could not be affected by the
imagination or the living conditions of a pregnant woman. For proof, he recorded these statistics
for 1821:9,178 of 21,158 infants born in Paris were illegitimate, but none of them were monsters,
despite the terrible conditions their mothers had endured during their pregnancies. Jean-
Baptiste BArard, Causes de la monstruositg et autres anomalies de l'organisation humaine (Paris:
Didot le Jeune, 1835), 7.
46. Katha Pollitt writes interestingly about the legacy of blaming women for a host of ills
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self restrainment, but will indulge every caprice, every passion, utterly
regardless of the unseen and unloved embryo. 4 7  The specter of
unbridled appetites haunts this passage. The nineteenth-century
campaign to criminalize abortion sought to replace a pregnant
woman's testimony about her pregnancy with an externally imposed
medical authority. Reva Siegel has shown that this campaign had the
effect of claiming for physicians "a special competence to mediate
between a woman and the state," an effect that continues to be
important."
The prevailing views in the nineteenth century permitted physicians
to step in and "restrain" women who were unwilling or unable to
restrain themselves. Both eighteenth-century discourses that
attributed fetal malformations to maternal mental activity, and
nineteenth-century regulations concerning pregnant women, medical
authority, and abortion, served to make women's role in reproduction
conform to prevailing ideas about women's social place. As Siegel
notes, "[r]egulations governing the conditions in which women
conceive, gestate, and nurture children express social attitudes about
sexuality and motherhood and, in turn, shape women's experience of
sexuality and motherhood."'49
Katha Pollitt analyzes these social attitudes in a provocative article
entitled "'Fetal Rights': A New Assault on Feminism." Pollitt asks,
"[h]ow have we come to see women as the major threat to the health
of their newborns, and the womb as the most dangerous place a child
will ever inhabit?"50 As I have shown, this is not a new question.
Currently, women in the United States who use drugs, especially
cocaine, during pregnancy may face criminal prosecution for a variety
of offenses, from drug trafficking to criminal child abuse to assault
with a deadly weapon. Yet, Carol E. Tracy noted in 1990 that only
11 percent of the pregnant women who need substance-abuse
treatment get it. Tracy wrote, "we live in a society that romanticizes
motherhood but provides virtually no structural supports for moth-
47. Cited in Reva Siegel, "Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection," Stanford Law Review 44 (2): 301 (1992).
48. Ibid., 296. This comprehensive analysis of the nineteenth-century campaign against
abortion and its importance for the history and current state of reproductive law fills in many
of the gaps in my inquiry between eighteenth-century understandings of pregnancy and the move
in the late twentieth century to criminalize the behavior of pregnant women. I am grateful to
Professor Siegel for bringing her work to my attention. For a historical look at reproductive cir-
cumstances in the nineteenth century, see Janet Farrell Brodie. Contraception and Abortion in
Nineteenth-Century America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
49. Siegel, "Reasoning from the Body," 72.
50. Katha Pollitt, "'Fetal Rights': A New Assault on Feminism," The Nation, 26 March 1990,
410.
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ers.'"' The situation is improving-ten years ago virtually no drug
treatment programs would accept pregnant users, whereas now about
75 percent do. At the time of the initial trial of Jennifer Johnson in
1990, however, there were approximately 4,500 drug-addicted
pregnant women in Florida, 2,000 of whom were on waiting lists for
the 135 drug treatment beds available statewide for pregnant
women.5 2  Many drug treatment centers routinely turn away preg-
nant addicts, few have obstetricians on their staffs, and pregnant drug
users avoid even basic prenatal care for fear of being reported.
Thirty-seven thousand babies are born in the United States each year
to drug-addicted women; fetal-alcohol syndrome affects one of every
one thousand U.S. births; and 1.5 percent of newborns in New York
City are HIV-seropositive.53 The Supreme Court, in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert (1976), struck down EEOC guidelines requiring
employers to provide maternity benefits under their disability
programs. In his dissent, Justice William Brennan remarked that the
United States is one of the few Western nations in the world with no
universal legal and social provisions for maternity.54
Motherhood cannot be separated from the social conditions that
surround it. The United States confronts the tragedies of teenage
pregnancy, women and young children with AIDS, single-mother
households living below the poverty line, inner-city crime, drive-by
shootings, and homelessness. The overwhelming response has been
51. Carol E. Tracy, "Help the Women Drug Users," Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 September
1990, sec. A, p. 21. In ironic contrast to the situation Tracy describes, a hospital program at the
Medical University of South Carolina in Charleston allegedly used threats of public exposure
and of jail to force pregnant women into drug treatment. In February 1994, the Office of Civil
Rights of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services initiated an investigation into
whether or not the South Carolina program is discriminatory, because most of the women tested
for drugs or jailed are African-American. See Philip J. Hilts, "Hospital Is Object of Rights
Inquiry: Blacks Make Up Majority of Pregnant Women Tested for Drugs and Coerced," New
York Times, 6 February 1994, sec. A, p. 29. In January 1993, the Philadelphia Commission on
Human Relations and the Women's Law Project held a public hearing to investigate drug
treatment programs in Philadelphia that were denying their services to pregnant women. Many
drug treatment programs consider pregnant women too high-risk to treat because the programs
do not have obstetricians on staff or because they believe they cannot handle miscarriages or
other emergencies. See Fawn Vrazo, "Some Drug Programs Wary of Pregnant Women,"
Philadelphia Inquirer, 11 January 1994, sec. B, pp. 1-2.
52. Brian McCormick, "Drug Trafficking Conviction Overturned in Cocaine-Baby Case,"
American Medical News, 10 August 1992, p. 11.
53. James F. Drane, "Medical Ethics and Maternal-Fetal Conflicts," Pennsylvania Medicine
95 (July 1992): 12-16. The Committee on Bioethics of the American Academy of Pediatrics
advises physicians to honor a woman's refusal of fetal procedures, unless the fetus will suffer
irrevocable harm without them, the treatment is clearly indicated and likely to be effective, and
the risk to the pregnant woman is low. If the woman refuses despite these conditions, the
Committee recommends consultation with a hospital ethics committee and advises turning to
courts only as a last resort. See American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics,
"Fetal Therapy: Ethical Considerations," Pediatrics 81 (6): 898-99 (1988).
54. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976). Paraphrased in Whitbeck,
"Moral Implications," in Bondeson et al., eds., Abortion, 263.
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to criminalize acts of desperation such as drug use rather than to
provide prevention or treatment services, to create jobs programs for
inner-city youth, to improve the public education system, or to devise
a system for regulating firearms. The assertion that a person
represents a "danger to self and others" constitutes the legal
justification for curtailing the individual's civil rights. This jus-
tification fuels the discussion of mandatory drug treatment for
pregnant women but it has not led the courts, for example, to impose
drug treatment upon all drug users, or to mandate medical treatment
for other untreated diseases." The medicolegal system in the United
States, defined as it is by adversarial relations and contests, cannot
adequately grapple with the problem of establishing a reasonable
standard of care for pregnant women.56 For example, increasing
"fetal rights" will inevitably allow children to bring lawsuits against
their mothers for prenatal injuries. Roe v. Wade does not prevent tort
actions for pre-viable fetuses. At the same time, a maternal duty to
utilize prenatal technologies has been emerging.
55. Wendy Chavkin, "Mandatory Treatment for Drug Use During Pregnancy," Journal of
the American Medical Association 266 (18 September 1991): 1556-61. Chavkin argues that
mandating treatment furthers discrimination against poor minority women, and cites Veronika
Kolder, Janet Gallagher, and Michael Parsons, "Court Ordered Obstetrical Interventions," New
England Journal of Medicine 316 (7 May 1987): 1192-96. In this 1986 study of court-ordered
Cesarean sections: 81 percent involved minority women, 24 percent involved women who were
non-English speaking, and 100 percent involved clinic patients. The survey represented women
from 45 states and the District of Columbia who had refused therapy deemed necessary for their
fetuses. The data spanned statistics for 1981 to 1986, and the sample included white. Asian, and
African-American women.
The study revealed that in Florida, the rate of drug-use reporting among pregnant women was
ten times higher for African-American women than for white women. Instead of reporting and
prosecuting pregnant women who use drugs, Chavkin argues, we need to enhance drug
treatment programs so that they are welcoming for pregnant women, are set up to serve their
needs, and are readily available. As long as such programs are scarce and of poor quality,
debates about mandating them remain merely symbolic. Chavkin points out that the American
Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists oppose court-
ordered treatment or penalties for the behaviors of pregnant women. See AMA Board of
Trustees Report, "Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments
and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women," Journal of the
American Medical Association 264 (28 November 1990): 2663-70, and American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists Statement, "Patient Choice: Maternal-Fetal Conflict," Women's
Health Issues 1 (fall 1990): 13-15. See also Wendy Chavkin, "Drug Addiction and Pregnancy:
Policy Crossroads." American Journal of Public Health 80 (1990): 483-87; Lynn Paltrow, Case
Overview of Arguments Against Permitting Forced Surgery, Prosecution of Pregnant Women or
Civil Sanctions Against Them for Conduct During Pregnancy (New York: ACLU Reproductive
Freedom Project, 1989); M. McNulty, "Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal
Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses," Review of Law and
Social Change 16 (1987/88): 277-319; and W.K. Mariner, L.H. Glantz, and G.J. Ames,
"Pregnancy, Drugs, and the Perils of Prosecution," Criminal Justice Ethics 9 (1): 30-41 (1990).
56. See Robert H. Blank, "Emerging Notions of Women's Rights and Responsibilities
During Gestation," Journal of Legal Medicine 7 (4): 441-69 (1986), and Margery W. Shaw,
"Genetically Defective Children: Emerging Legal Considerations," American Journalof Law and
Medicine 3 (3): 333-40 (1977). See also Iris Marion Young, "Punishment, Treatment,
Empowerment: Three Approaches to Policy for Pregnant Addicts," Feminist Studies 20 (Spring
1994): 33-57, an article that applies psychoanalytic ideas to formulate "a feminist ethic of care."
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It is deceptively easy to conclude that eighteenth-century
embryology was not sufficiently advanced to produce more scientific
explanations for "monsters." The more pressing question is whether
we can learn anything from these early medical debates that might
illuminate the complicated social, ethical, medical, and legal issues we
currently face.57 For example, in prosecuting women for drug use
during pregnancy, is the state again displacing the systemic
socioeconomic problems of unemployment, poverty, and despair onto
the bodies of women, and taking over control of these bodies because
women allegedly lack "self-control"? Jurists try to translate the moral
expectation that the pregnant woman will make every attempt to
ensure the healthy development of her fetus into an idea of enforce-
able legal duty. In this attempt, they unavoidably subordinate a
woman's rights to privacy and autonomy to a codification of the
state's interest in protecting her fetus from harm.5" In a 1988 Illinois
case, a mother sued for prenatal injuries that occurred during an
automobile accident when she was five months pregnant. The court
summarized the situation created by the notion that fetuses have a
cognizable "legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body" by
stating:
It is the firmly held belief of some that a woman should subor-
dinate her right to control her life when she decides to become
pregnant or does become pregnant: anything which might
possibly harm the developing fetus should be prohibited and all
things which might positively affect the developing fetus should
be mandated under the penalty of law be it criminal or civil.59
The court found for the mother in this case.
57. My focus is on only one aspect of the complicated politics of reproductive change in the
late twentieth century: the criminalization of the social conduct of pregnant women. Cases in
which courts have mandated that a pregnant woman have a Cesarean section against her will
raise some of the same issues of criminalization and adversarial definitions of mother and fetus
(as they also did in the eighteenth century). See Mary Sue Henifin, Ruth Hubbard, and Judy
Norsigian, "Prenatal Screening," and Janet Gallagher. "Fetus as Patient," both in Reproductive
Laws for the 1990s. ed. Sherrill Cohen and Nadine Taub (Clifton. NJ: Humana Press, 1989), 155-
83. 185-235. For treatment of employers' "fetal protection policies" that exclude fertile women
from certain workplaces, see note 60 below. For an overview of the legal and ethical issues
surrounding new reproductive technologies, see Robert H. Blank, Regulating Reproduction (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
58. In this treatment, the pregnant woman is a medium or vehicle rather than an owner of
property. See Judith Roof, "The Ideology of Fair Use: Xeroxing and Reproductive Rights,"
Hypatia 7 (spring 1992): 63-73, and Dawn Johnsen, "From Driving to Drugs: Governmental
Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives and Webster," University of Pennsylvania Law Review
138 (1989): 179-215.
59. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988); cited and discussed in Robin M. Trindel,
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A number of feminist legal scholars have criticized the idea of fetal
rights and, consequently, the notion of fetal personhood itself that
such rights presuppose. Conceiving and bearing children has never
been risk-free, and women have always made, and been expected to
make, sacrifices during pregnancy. However, a pregnant woman must
have a different status with respect to her fetus than do others,
including the state. Otherwise, women's ownership of their own
bodies is challenged, and pregnant women are punished for social ills
such as poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, and unequal access to
education and health care. In juridical terms, there is no "bright line"
which may confine this responsibility. "Until the child is brought
forth from the woman's body," Janet Gallagher writes, "our relation-
ship with it must be mediated by her. The alternative adopts a
brutally coercive stance toward pregnant women, viewing them as
means to an end and denying them the bodily integrity and self-
determination specific to human dignity."'
The crux of this dilemma can be located in the language of rights
itself. A focus on rights grounds the discussion in privacy law, which
becomes meaningless if the contents of a pregnant woman's womb can
be severed from her person and granted separate interests. The
constitutional right of decisional privacy detailed in Griswold v.
Connecticut has begun to yield its place to the rights of fetuses, pitting
pregnant women not just against the products of their bodies, but
60. Janet Gallagher, "Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal
Rights," Harvard Women's Law Journal 10 (spring 1987): 57-58. The view Gallagher critiques
has been extended to include all women of child-bearing age as potentially pregnant, a view that
underlies employer-enforced "fetal protection" policies that exclude women from certain jobs.
The best known of these recent cases was heard by the United States Supreme Court. See
United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). The Court ruled for the
women, but in an earlier hearing by the Seventh Circuit, Judge Coffey remarked, "This is the
case about the women who want to hurt their fetuses." This remark is cited in David L. Kirp,
"The Pitfalls of 'Fetal Protection,"' Society 28 (March/April 1991): 70. For a full discussion of
exclusionary employment policies, see Sally J. Kenney, For Whose Protection? Reproductive
Hazards and Exclusionary Policies in the United States and Britain (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1992). Susan Faludi remarks that no one has tried to prevent women from
working at video display terminals or in daycare centers where they are at risk for
cytomegalovirus, in "Your Womb or Your Job," Mother Jones 16 (November/December 1991):
59-66, 71. See also Elaine Draper, "Fetal Exclusion Policies and Gendered Constructions of
Suitable Work," Social Problems 40 (1): 90-107 (1993), and Lucinda M. Finley, "Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate," Columbia Law
Review 86 (1986): 1118-82. Also note that little attention has been paid to the effect of
workplace toxins on fathers, despite evidence that men exposed to toxic chemicals can pass birth
malformations on to their children. See Ricardo A. Yazigi, Randall R. Odem, and Kenneth
Polakoski, "Demonstration of Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human Spermatozoa," Journal of
the American Medical Association 266 (9 October 1991): 1956-59. In addition, sperm production
in the average male has declined dramatically over the last fifty years, and the reasons appear
to be environmental rather than genetic. See Michael Zimmerman, "Working With Chemicals
Is a Threat to Fathers," Philadelphia Inquirer, 2 May 1993, sec. D, p. 5.
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against their very bodies.6 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, like Griswold a
case involving contraceptive practice, the court held, "If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual... to be free
from unwarranted intrusion." 62  Privacy rights in law are not
monolithic: they include the rights to be left alone, to refuse medical
treatment, and to have possession of and power over one's own
person.63 Christyne L. Neff persuasively argues that, for this reason,
the doctrine of bodily integrity serves the arguments of reproductive
freedom better than does privacy law. Bodily integrity doctrine
underpins legal notions of assault and battery, search and seizure,
informed consent, and the right to refuse medical treatment.
Separating the fetus from a pregnant woman pursues what Neff calls
"an analysis that views the pregnant woman as a duality [and] is itself
a violation of woman's bodily integrity. '  Privacy rights in their
multiple forms cannot be distinguished so easily from the legal notion
of bodily integrity, since the concept of privacy includes ideas about
the body as a refuge, a space protected from state intrusion.65
Indeed, a version of the idea of bodily integrity seems to have existed
for early modern European thinkers, a complex irony given the ar-
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), invalidated statutes banning contraception.
The idea of holding rights to "property in one's own person" and to bodily self-determination
in relation to women's bodies as the media for pregnancies is asserted by Rosalind Pollack
Petchesky in "Reproductive Freedom: Beyond 'A Woman's Right to Choose,"' Signs 5 (summer
1980): 661-85. A recent discussion of privacy law in relation to abortion rights can be found in
David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade
(New York: Macmillan, 1994). See also Iris Marion Young, "Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity
and Alienation," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (February 1984): 45-62.
62. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
63. It is important to maintain distinctions between the constitutional right to privacy,
decisional privacy, and tort privacy. For example, Justice Blackmun has been criticized for his
failure "to distinguish carefully the physical privacy of seclusion from the decisional privacy of
liberty or autonomous choice," when he famously stated in Roe that "a pregnant woman cannot
be isolated in her privacy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). See Anita L. Allen, "Tribe's
Judicious Feminism," Stanford Law Review 44 (1): 187 (1991). The political elasticity of the word
"right" became clear at the September 1994 United Nations conference on population held in
Cairo, during which time United States and European officials made efforts to appease Vatican
and Islamic concerns over the language discussing abortion. In a masterly effort at noncommit-
tal speech, Timothy E. Wirth, the United States Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs,
remarked, "The question of quote right unquote has been a controversial issue. Some people
had interpreted the use of the word 'right' in the document as establishing an understood right
as is the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, and there is a language that is being proposed by
the European Union to define what is meant by right." See Alan Cowell, "A Try at a Truce
Over Population," New York Times, 15 September 1994, sec. A, p. 1. The concept remains
ideologically, if not legally, slippery.
64. Christyne L. Neff, "Woman, Womb, and Bodily Integrity," Yale Journal of Law and
Feminism 3 (spring 1991): 351. See also Petchesky, "Reproductive Freedom," and Katherine
De Gama, "A Brave New World? Rights Discourse and the Politics of Reproductive Anatomy,"
Journal of Law and Society 20 (spring 1993): 114-30.
65. Linda C. McClain argues that privacy rights are tied to an imagery of sanctuary and
refuge in "Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Temple, and the Body," Yale Journal of
Law & the Humanities 7 (winter 1995): 195. I am grateful to Professor McClain for sharing her
work with me.
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guments I have been making. At the same time, the embeddedness
of pregnancy within a network of social practices and individual
interests may have been more clearly delineated in earlier historical
periods in Europe than it is in the United States today.
CONCLUSION
The eighteenth-century maternal imagination debates were intricate
from both biological and philosophical perspectives. To contend that
the maternal imagination was impotent, physicians subscribed to
preformationism and used the physiologically inaccurate argument
that the fully independent fetus shared no circulatory or nervous
communication with its mother and, thus, could not respond to her
mental or sensory experiences. In contrast, writers who affirmed the
power of the maternal imagination chastised those who impugned
women's honesty concerning their experiences of pregnancy. This
eighteenth-century controversy, then, radically questioned the
ontologic relation between pregnant women and fetuses, and did so
in unexpected ways. That ontologic relation continues to be vexed.
In 1668, Franqois Mauriceau described pregnancy as "a rough Sea"
and urged pregnant women "to be careful to overcome and moderate
her Passions, as not to be excessive angry; and above all, that she be
not afrighted; nor that any melancholy news be suddenly told her"
because she might miscarry or harm her fetus. He wrote of the
pregnant woman's "so great loathings, and so many different longings,
and strong passions for strange things."' Three hundred years later,
David L. Kirp proposes that in light of the problem of environmental
and workplace hazards, "the more that is learned about these
insidious dangers, the more remarkable it becomes that any fetus
navigates the perilous voyage from conception to birth healthy and
intact. '  It is, finally, the socioeconomic infrastructure that needs
sanction and repair, not the bodies of women.
66. Franqois Mauriceau, The Diseases of Women with Child and in Child-bed, trans. Hugh
Chamberlen (London: John Darby, 1683), 58, 65.
67. Kirp, "The Pitfalls of 'Fetal Protection,"' 76.
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